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BACK TO THE FARM: A CALL TO RE-INVIGORATE NEW
YORK CITY’S BIOSOLID PROGRAM
Brendan Collins*
INTRODUCTION
From late January until April of 2018, Parrish, a small town of 982 residents in
Alabama, gained national media attention for being caught in a legal battle over New
York City’s (“NYC”) sewage sludge,1 “the solid byproduct of wastewater
treatment.”2 The situation goes as follows: beginning in early 2017, NYC contracted
with a company called Big Sky Environmental (“Big Sky”), which disposed of
NYC’s sewage sludge at its landfill site3 in Adamsville, Alabama.4 The Big Sky
landfill is approximately twenty miles east of Parrish. However, another town called
West Jefferson, located in between Parrish and the Big Sky landfill, gained an
injunction in federal court to keep the sewage sludge from passing through its
township.5 As a result, the “federal court decision stranded roughly 250 containers
full of treated” NYC sewage sludge in Parrish.6 According to Parrish Mayor Heather

* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; College of the Holy Cross, 2016. I would like to
thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation’s Editorial Staff for all of their assistance. I would also like to
thank my parents and sister, Claire Collins, for always supporting me. In addition, I would like to thank
Maeve Kane for telling me about this important topic while we were at Playa Tunco in El Salvador. Finally,
I would like to especially thank Professor John Nagle (1960-2019) for being a mentor to me on this Note—
rest in peace.
1 Associated Press, Small Alabama Town Raises a Big Stink About Abandoned New York City 'poop
train', U.S.A. TODAY (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 2018/04/18/ smallalabama-town-raises-big-stink-abandoned-new-york-city-poop-train/527364002/.
2 Wastewater Treatment System, N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dep/water/wastewater-treatment-system.page (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
3 Associated Press, supra note 1.
4 Elaine Jones, Council Denies Business License for Big Sky, DAILY MOUNTAIN EAGLE (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://mountaineagle.com/stories/council-denies-business-license-for-big-sky,15008. According to its
website, “Big Sky Environmental owns and operates a 1,525-acre disposal site with an excess of 125 million
cubic yards of capacity.” About Big Sky Environmental, BIG SKY ENVTL.,
https://www.bigskyenv.com/about_us (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
5 Associated Press, supra note 1. In a written complaint, West Jefferson’s attorney wrote that the
sewage sludge “smells of dead rotting animals as well as human waste,” and the trains caused the town to
become “infested with flies.” Id.
6 Nigel Duara, How New York City’s Shit Ended up Stuck on a Train in Alabama, VICE NEWS (Apr. 16,
2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ywxeag/how-new-york-citys-shit-ended-up-stuck-on-a-train-inalabama.
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Hall, the smell was “unbearable” in Alabama’s humid climate and “it was a
nightmare for everybody, especially for those who have breathing problems.”7
On February 28, 2018, Parrish’s town council cast a unanimous vote denying
Big Sky the business license to continue operating its shipment of sewage sludge.8
Finally, in mid-April of 2018, the “poop trains,” as they became known through
national media coverage, left Parrish.9 As a result of the Parrish media storm, NYC
ended its contract with Big Sky10 and “has discontinued shipping [its sewage sludge]
to Alabama’s landfills for the time being.”11
The controversy in Parrish is illustrative of the historical challenges that NYC
has faced in managing its immense, daily deposits of sewage sludge. Part I of this
Note will begin by defining sewage sludge and then catalogue how NYC relied on
dumping its untreated sewage sludge into the ocean as its primary disposal method
until the early 1990s. Part I will also describe the federal legislation that attempted
to curtail the widespread dumping of sewage sludge into the ocean. Further, Part I
will highlight the legal battle that ensued over NYC’s ocean dumping of sewage
sludge, which ultimately rallied Congress to pass the Ocean Dumping Ban Act
(“ODBA”). Finally, Part I will conclude by describing how the ODBA officially
barred NYC from utilizing its coastal dumping method.
Part II of this Note will begin by weighing the disposal options that NYC needed
to consider following the passage of the ODBA’s federal ban on dumping sewage
sludge into the ocean. In lieu of ocean dumping, NYC discovered that it had two
primary disposal options for its sewage sludge: the first involved land spreading its
sewage sludge in the form of biosolids and the second involved placing its sewage
sludge in landfills. Part II will also define biosolids and describe the scientific
process of turning sewage sludge into a marketable product for agricultural use. Part
II will further discuss the rise and decline of New York’s Sludge Management
Program, through which NYC sold its treated sewage sludge as biosolids to farmers
primarily in the Midwest as a form of fertilizer. Part II will close by discussing
NYC’s expansion of its landfill contracts—particularly in southern states like
Alabama—in order to reduce sewage sludge disposal costs.
Part III of this Note will advocate for NYC to return to using biosolids as the
primary method for the disposal of its sewage sludge. Part III will begin by
discussing the legal dilemmas facing the landfilling method, as evidenced by the
litigation and local governance backlash in Alabama in the spring of 2018. Next,
Part III will compare and contrast the public and legal backlash NYC received from
landfilling to the positive reaction NYC received when it began selling its sewage
Jones, supra note 4.
Id.
9 Colin Dwyer, The Poop Train's Reign of Terror in Small-Town Alabama Has Ended, NAT’L. PUB.
RADIO, INC. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/18/603718526/the-pooptrains-reign-of-terror-in-small-town-alabama-has-ended.
10 Duara, supra note 6; see also Dennis Pillion, New York Stops Sewage Trains to Alabama Landfill,
AL.COM (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/
03/new_york_halts_sewage_trains_t.html.
11 Associated Press, supra note 1.
7
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sludge as biosolids to farmers in states like Colorado in the early 1990s. Unlike the
landfill backlash in Alabama, NYC’s biosolids gained traction largely due to
advocacy from the agricultural community. Finally, Part III will advocate for NYC
to return to using biosolids because they are more environmentally sustainable. This
portion of Part III will discuss how the finite amount of land that is usable for
purposes of landfilling is shrinking, while in contrast, biosolids are environmentally
beneficial because they have the capability of restoring the natural phosphorus cycle.
This Note will conclude by summarizing how biosolids avoid the legal pitfalls
of landfilling, and instead, offer a way for cities to market their waste to an
enthusiastic agricultural consumer with an environmentally sustainable product.
The conclusion will also emphasize how NYC can serve as a model for other cities
interested in developing sustainable waste management systems for their sewage
sludge.
I. THE HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF OCEAN DUMPING
A. THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN DUMPING
Before discussing NYC’s solutions to sewage sludge management, it is
important to define two important terms. The first is “sewage sludge” and the second
is “ocean dumping.” Sewage sludge is the by-product that comes from municipal
wastewater treatment, which often contains a variety of toxic materials such as
“PCBs, petroleum hydrocarbons, heavy metals, and pathogenic bacteria and
viruses.”12 Ocean dumping, broadly speaking, involves the deliberate disposing of
wastes, including sewage sludge, at sea.13
NYC’s sewage sludge story began in 1884, when NYC first took steps to deal
with its growing sewage problem by directing its sewage into stream banks flowing
out of NYC.14 However, this redirection of the sewage into the stream banks
deteriorated the NYC Harbor, so in 1938, NYC began dumping its sewage sludge
into the ocean.15 NYC dumped its sewage sludge twelve miles off the coast of New
York and New Jersey16 in a waterway known as the New York Bight Apex.17

12 Charles B. Anderson, Ocean Dumping and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 1
LOY. MAR. L.J. 79, 80 (2002). The term “PCBs” refers to “a group of man-made organic chemicals
consisting of carbon, hydrogen and chlorine atoms.” PCBs were used “in hundreds of industrial and
commercial applications” until they were banned for their cancer-causing effects and for negatively
impacting the “immune system, reproductive system, nervous system, endocrine system” in 1979. Learn
about Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-aboutpolychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
13 Anderson, supra note 12, at 80.
14 Marla Weinstein, From Waste to Plate: Examining the Role of Urban Biosolids in Recycling
Phosphorus (May 2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Columbia University).
15 Id.
16 U.S. v. N.Y., 972 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1992).
17 Anderson, supra note 12, at 86.
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By 1970, there was a growing, national concern about the environmental impact
of ocean dumping,18 which was largely unregulated.19 At that point in time,
regulation of ocean dumping was “piecemeal” with no federal agency authorized to
comprehensively regulate it, so states were limited to regulate only within three
miles off their respective shores.20 The first major step against ocean dumping came
in October of 1970 when President Nixon commissioned the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to research and report on the environmental impact of
ocean dumping on the ocean’s overall health.21 The CEQ’s report advocated for
Congressional action to prevent “consequential” environmental harm.22 The report
found the waste being dumped into the ocean to be toxic to humans and marine
wildlife.23 Further, continued dumping would lead to a depletion of the oxygen
necessary “to maintain the marine ecosystem,” a negative economic impact from a
reduction in healthy fish populations, and lasting damage to the ocean’s aesthetic
values.24
B. THE FIGHT FOR A FEDERAL BAN ON OCEAN DUMPING
Congress responded to the CEQ’s alarming report by passing the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (“MPRSA”) on October 23, 1972, which
had the primary purpose “(1) to regulate, as much as possible, all disposal of wastes
in ocean waters; and (2) to limit strictly the dumping into ocean waters of any
material which would adversely affect human health and the environment.”25
Although Title I of the MPRSA prohibited most kinds of dumping, it still allowed
ocean dumping in the limited circumstances pursuant to a permit issued jointly by
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.26
In 1977, Congress was dissatisfied “with the EPA's progress in curtailing the
ocean dumping of sewage sludge,” which largely continued under the MPRSA’s
permit system, and so it amended the MPRSA.27 This amendment banned “the
Id. at 81-82.
John A. Guarascio, The Regulation of Ocean Dumping After City of New York v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 701, 702 (1985).
20 Id. at 710-11.
21 Anderson, supra note 12, at 82.
22 Guarascio, supra note 19, at 710.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Guarascio, supra note 19, at 711; see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 84. The MPRSA includes
three titles: Title I prohibited the transport of certain materials to be dumped in the ocean and created a
system to gain permit to ocean that is jointly regulated by the EPA and the Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. §
1412(a) (2018); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1440 (2018); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a)-(b) (2018). Title II of the MPRSA
authorizes research on the environmental impact of ocean dumping on the oceanic and coastal ecosystems
and the investigation of alternative disposal methods as a replacement of ocean dumping. 3 U.S.C. §§ 14411443 (2018). Title III authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate conservation sites. 16 U.S.C. §
1432 (2000).
26 Anderson, supra note 12, at 84.
27 Id. at 85. The EPA developed a pattern of “issuing interim permits to municipalities which were
18
19
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dumping of all sewage sludge which did not meet EPA criteria by December 31,
1981.”28 However, the 1977 amendment left an unintended loophole for ocean
dumping by defining sewage sludge as waste that “unreasonably degrade or
endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological
systems, and economic potentialities.”29
While the federal government attempted to crack down on ocean dumping, NYC
found itself unable to dispose of its waste through means of land disposal and sued
the EPA to gain an interim permit to continue to dump its sewage sludge into the
ocean past the 1981 deadline.30 At the time of the lawsuit, NYC was dumping 260
dry tons of sewage sludge into the New York Bight Apex on a daily basis.31 The
EPA defended its termination of the interim permits by claiming the “1977
amendment was an absolute ban on ocean dumping after the 1981 deadline” and it
no longer needed to consider the reasonableness or feasibility of NYC’s dumping.32
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York analyzed the
1977 amendment’s statutory language and held that NYC was entitled to summary
judgment.33 The court held the “1981 deadline remains intact, but only for dumping
that EPA determines . . . will unreasonably degrade the environment,” and the EPA
must allow NYC to apply for an interim permit.34
Congress responded to the decision in New York v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency by passing the ODBA in 1988.35 The ODBA “amend[ed] the
MPRSA to make it unlawful to dispose of all sewage sludge and (except on an
emergency basis) industrial waste after December 31, 1991.”36 Along with its
unable to obtain general or special permits to dump sewage sludge because the sewage sludge contained
concentrations of prohibited toxic materials.” Id. The justification for these interim permits was that there
were “no economically feasible alternatives.” Id. These interim permits conditioned on promises of phasing
out of ocean dumping and replacing it with “the development of acceptable land-based disposal alternatives.”
Id.
28 Id. at 85; see also Pub. L. No. 95-153, § 4, 91 Stat. 1255 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1412(a) (2018)).).
29 Anderson, supra note 12, at 84 (citing Pub. L. No. 95-153, § 4, 91 Stat. 1255 (1977) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1977))).
30 Id. at 86; see also New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 543 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
31 New York v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 543 F. Supp. at 1085.
32 Guarascio, supra note 19, at 722; see also New York v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 543 F. Supp. at
1086.
33 New York v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 543 F. Supp. at 1115.
34 Id.
35 Anderson, supra note 12, at 88. The ODBA works in conjunction with the Clean Water Act to
regulate all discharges into navigable waters. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RES. SERV., OCEAN DUMPING
ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW 4 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20028.pdf. These include territorial
seas. Id. To avoid regulatory overlap between the two statutes, the EPA promulgated a uniform set of
regulatory standards under 40 CFR Parts 220-229 where the ODBA preempts the CWA for control of coastal
waters and open oceans, while the CWA retains controls over estuaries. Id. States are left the ability to
control ocean dumping in the waters that fall within their jurisdictions under limited circumstances. Id.
36 Anderson, supra note 12, at 88. Public criticism of sewage sludge ocean dumping arose after the
summer of 1988, when the New York and New Jersey coasts experienced significant pollution. Edward
McCann, Terminating Ocean Dumping of Municipal Sewage Sludge: A Political Solution to an
Environmental Problem, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 69, 100 (1990). The mounting public outcry led to
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prohibition on dumping by the end of 1991, the ODBA also included court orders
that required NYC and other ocean dumpers to follow schedules for when their
dumping practices would cease.37
With ocean dumping effectively banned, NYC was suddenly left with a major
dilemma: what to do with all of its sewage sludge?
II. WEIGHING OPTIONS
Following the passage of the ODBA, NYC considered “three commercially
feasible alternatives to disposing waste in the medium of ocean water: landfilling,
land spreading, and incineration.”38 The first option, landfilling, “is a process which
involves impounding waste in storage lagoons, basins[,] or pits.”39 The second
option, land spreading, involves using the sewage sludge as biosolids, which are
defined as treated sewage sludge that can be applied to soil as a fertilizer.40 The third
option is incineration, or burning sewage sludge.41
Despite being an effective mode of destruction, the incineration method releases
a variety of atmospheric gases, which are barred by environmental legislation, like
the Clean Air Act, because of the negative environmental impact that results from
the particulates entering the atmosphere during the burning.42 With the incineration
option off the table, NYC was essentially left with two options to deal with its
sewage sludge problem: land spreading its sewage sludge as biosolids or relying on
landfills to store the sewage sludge. The subsequent portion of this Part will discuss
how NYC developed a system for disposing of sewage sludge.
A. WHAT ARE BIOSOLIDS?
As previously mentioned, sewage sludge “is the solid byproduct of wastewater
treatment.”43 According to the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation Division of Materials Management Bureau of Waste Reduction &
Recycling, biosolids are the recyclable byproduct that are created as a result of

pressure for state legislation and to promises by NYC to cease sewage sludge dumping in the ocean by 1998.
Id. Congress was skeptical of this promise and pushed ahead with the ODBA to end ocean dumping of
sewage sludge by 1992. Id. at 101-02.
37 Reilly in New York to Mark End of Sewage Sludge Dumping, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/reilly-new-york-mark-end-sewage-sludge-dumping.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2019). The ODBA required NYC to work closely with the EPA to draw terms for their ocean
dumping cessation. Id. The ODBA also imposed a $600 penalty (which would rise every subsequent year)
for every dry ton dumped in the ocean beyond the allotted grace period. Anderson, supra note 12, at 89.
38 Guarascio, supra note 19, at 707.
39 Id.
40 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 13.
41 Guarascio, supra note 19, at 707.
42 Id. at 708. The ash that is produced during the incineration process is problematic because it tends to
“concentrate heavy metals and disperse them into the atmosphere.” Id.
43 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2.
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sewage treatment at a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (“POTWs”).44 When
sewage sludge gets treated, there are two residual byproducts. The first byproduct
is the treated liquid, effluent, which “is typically discharged to a nearby stream.”45
The second byproduct is the “solid or semi-solid organic” materials which gets
removed from the sewage sludge during treatment.46
Turning sewage into biosolids is a multi-step process. First, the raw sewage
enters a POTWs,47 where it flows through a series of pools and pumps designed to
separate the effluent from the sewage sludge.48 The first step is to skim the fats,
greases, and oils from the flowing sewage off the surface.49 The sewage is pooled,
and the solid sewage sludge collects in the bottom of the pool where it is then
separated from the effluent.50
The next step in further separating the effluent from the sewage sludge is known
as the digestion process.51 The digestion process works in the same way that the
human body digests food.52 The pool of sewage sludge gets heated to ninety-eight
degrees, like the human body, and then POTW employees introduce a variety of
bacteria into the sewage sludge.53 The digestion process is a “form of processing
that improves the quality of the material” and is an important step in the creation of
biogas.54
Following the digestion process, the sewage enters a centrifuge where the fluid
is rapidly spun.55 This process, known as the “dewatering process,” separates the
effluent from the solid material in the sewage.56 This remaining solid material is
sewage sludge and has the consistency of “moist soil.”57 After undergoing the
dewatering process, “the leftover solid product of the processed sludge is generally
referred to as ‘biosolids.’”58 Every day, NYC generates approximately 1,200 tons
of biosolids.59
44 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION DIV. OF MATERIALS MGMT. BUREAU OF WASTE
REDUCTION & RECYCLING (“NYSDEC”), NYSDEC SOLID WASTE FACTS 1 (1999). POTWs are sewage
treatment plants that are frequently publicly owned and operated by government agencies.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 7.
48 Radiolab, Poop Train, WNYCSTUDIOS.ORG, https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/poop-train (Sept.
24, 2013).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2.
52 Radiolab, supra note 48.
53 Id.
54 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2.
55 Radiolab, supra note 48.
56 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2.
57 Radiolab, supra note 48.
58 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2.
59 Biosolids Management Program, N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/wastewater/biohome.shtml
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190308194632/http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/wastewater/biohome.shtm
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Biosolids can be “removed from the treatment plant for [landfill] disposal or
beneficial use.”60 Biosolids that are used for beneficial use are typically “mixed with
a highly alkaline material, such as lime or Portland cement,” to create a biosolid
product that “resembles soil and is used as an agricultural liming agent.”61
Before a biosolid can be used for a beneficial use or disposed of in a landfill, it
must be stabilized to remove harmful organisms.62 “Stabilization” refers to the
process that reduces “the concentration of harmful (disease-causing) organisms,
odor, and in some cases the volume, of the biosolids.”63 There are a variety of ways
to stabilize biosolids. As previously mentioned in the description of wastewater
treatment, the digestion process is one form of stabilization because it aids in the
“break down [of] the complex organic substances found in untreated biosolids.”64
Also, previously mentioned, biosolids are commonly mixed with “alkaline material,
such as lime, or Portland cement.”65 This process, known as “lime stabilization,”
raises the pH of the biosolids which causes a reduction in “the concentration of
disease-causing organisms and reduces the odor of the material.”66 Finally, air
drying biosolids “on a sand bed or paved surface for an extended period of time” can
be used to stabilize biosolids, by evaporation creating a drier, safer product.67
In order for biosolids to be sold commercially, they must undergo additional
stabilization and disinfection treatments.68 “Advanced stabilization” is a term for a
variety of methods that “reduce harmful organisms to below detectable levels,” so
that the biosolids can be sold as “a marketable product.”69 Depending on which of
these methods is used, different kinds of marketable forms of biosolids are created.70
One method for advanced stabilization is composting, “an aerobic biological process
that accelerates the natural decomposition process under controlled conditions.”71
By putting the biosolids through the dewatering process and then mixing them with
“wood chips or yard waste,” the mixture can “decompose in an aerobic
environment.”72 Another process, known as heat drying or pelletization (for the
pellet shapes created by the process), relies on driers to “remove most of the water

l] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
60 NYSDEC, supra note 44, at 1.
61 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 59.
62 NYSDEC, supra note 44, at 1-2.
63 Id. at 1.
64 Id.
65 N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 59.
66 NYSDEC, supra note 44, at 1.
67 Id.
68 William Goldfarb et al., Unsafe Sewage Sludge of Beneficial Biosolids?: Liability, Planning, and
Management Issues Regarding the Land Application of Sewage Treatment Residuals, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 687, 688 (1999).
69 NYSDEC, supra note 44, at 2.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. (explaining that the mixture creates “a humus or soil-like material typically used for landscaping
and other soil amendments”).
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from biosolids.”73 Finally, a third advanced stabilization process is known as
“chemical fixation.” Chemical fixation is like the lime stabilization method, which
raises the pH of the biosolids, but this process involves adding “sufficient alkaline
material” so that heat is produced to treat the biosolids.74
Proper stabilization is key for biosolids to be recycled for beneficial reuses
because biosolids are regulated by Section 405 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) of
1972, as amended.75 Since 1993, biosolids have fallen under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit program and Part 503 Standards for the Use
or Disposal of Sewage Sludge (the “503 Rule”).76 Further, the 503 Rule “establishes
standards, which consist of general requirements, pollutant limits, management
practices, and operational standards” for biosolid treatment, the land spreading
biosolids, the disposal of biosolids in landfills, and the incineration of biosolids.77
The 503 Rule establishes biosolid standards including “pathogen and alternative
vector attraction reduction requirements” for both the land spreading biosolids and
the disposal of biosolids in landfills.78 As previously described, there are a variety
of methods for removing pathogens. The 503 Rule dictates that there are two classes
of biosolids based on their level of pathogens, and these classifications, in turn,
determine public access. Biosolids that qualify as Class A must pass a stricter degree
of stabilization and—upon that stabilization—can “be applied to lawns, home
gardens, or other types of land, or bagged for sale.”79 While public access to Class
A is unrestricted, Class B biosolids require less stabilization and have higher
pathogen levels, so they must be restricted.80 As a result, 503 Rules directs that Class
73 Id. (explaining that as a result of the heat, the resultant pellets can be sold “as a fertilizer or for soil
conditioning purposes”).
74 Id. (explaining that the resulting product is a liming agent commonly found in agriculture products).
75 Biosolids Laws and Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/biosolids/biosolids-laws-and-regulations (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. The standards outlined in the 503 Rule were developed from the “results of risk assessments for
chemicals that began in the mid-1970s.” Qin Lu et al., Land Application of Biosolids in the USA: A
Review, 2012 APPLIED & ENVTL. SOIL SCI. 1, 2 (2012). These assessments and the standards that came from
them were “more extensive than any previous federal rulemaking effort for sludge, and established biosolids
quality requirements for its land application.” Id.
79 Qin Lu et al., supra note 78, at 2. To be marketable as a Class A biosolid, manufacturers must ensure
that the biosolids have “less than 3 MPN per 4 grams total solids biosolids (dry weight basis) for density
of Salmonella sp., less than 1 PFU per 4 grams total solids biosolids (dry weight basis) for enteric viruses,
and less than 1 viable helminth ova per 4 gram total solids biosolids (dry weight basis) for viable helminth
ova.” Id.
80 Id. Class B “requires a fecal coliform density in the treated sewage sludge (biosolids) of 2 million
MPN or CFU per gram total solids biosolids (dry weight basis). Viable helminth ova are not necessarily
reduced in Class B biosolids.” Id. The term fecal coliforms refers to a substance’s density of bacterial
pollution. B. E. Jimenez-Cisneros, Helminth Ova Control in Wastewater and Sludge for Agriculture Reuse, 2
WATER & HEALTH 1, 5 (2007). Helminth ova are parasitic worms, which rely on a host to survive. Id. at 3.
Since the helminth ova cannot live on their own because of their need for a host to survive, the stabilizing
process deals with removing the eggs of the helminth ova from biosolids. Id. at 1-3. The EPA and the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) are particularly concerned about helminth ova egg elimination because of the
physical havoc that these eggs can wreak on the host. Id. If ingested, the eggs from helminth ova can cause
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B biosolids “limit crop harvesting, animal grazing, and public access for a certain
period of time.”81
B. NYC’S HISTORY WITH BIOSOLIDS
Following the passage of the ODBA, the NYC Department of Environmental
Protection created the 1990 Sludge Management Act (“NYC’s Biosolid Program”),
which included the “establishment of contracts between [NYC] and private
companies to process and beneficially reuse all city biosolids.”82 NYC saw that it
had the opportunity to turn its waste into a beneficial and marketable product.83 As
NYC ventured into the biosolid market, a fascinating tale unfolded that is
characterized by bias, perseverance, immense success, and rapid decline due to
externalities.
To be clear, NYC was not revolutionary when it came to marketing biosolids.
At this time, other cities were in the biosolid business as well. For example, King
County had been spreading its “Loop” biosolids throughout the Pacific Northwest
since 1976.84 Further, Milwaukee, the oldest producer of biosolids, had been
marketing its “Milorganite,” a slow-releasing nitrogen fertilizer, since 1926.85 While
serious health problems, particularly in the intestines, including “intestinal wall damage, hemorrhages,
deficient blood coagulation and undernourishment.” Id. at 3. Within the host, the helminth ova continue to
hatch eggs, with female helminth ova producing around twenty-seven million. Id. Further, helminth ova
eggs are harder to stabilize than bacteria because “in contrast to fecal coliforms, helminth ova cannot be
inactivated with chlorine, UV light or ozone.” Id. at 5. As a result, the 503 Rule creates strict standards on
helminth ova levels in Class A biosolids and also restricts access to Class B biosolids for concern about
helminth ova exposure. Qin Lu et al., supra note 78, at 2.
81 Qin Lu et al., supra note 78, at 2. It is important to note that there have been serious critiques of the
EPA’s Part 503 as being insufficient to properly gauge the safety of biosolids. In 2002, the National
Research Council made the following suggestion:
“There is no documented scientific evidence that the Part 503 rule has failed to protect public health.
However, additional scientific work is needed to reduce persistent uncertainty about the potential for adverse
human health effects from exposure to biosolids. There have been anecdotal allegations of disease, and
many scientific advances have occurred since the Part 503 rule was promulgated. To assure the public and to
protect public health, there is a critical need to update the scientific basis of the rule to (1) ensure that the
chemical and pathogen standards are supported by current scientific data and risk-assessment methods, (2)
demonstrate effective enforcement of the Part 503 rule, and (3) validate the effectiveness of biosolidsmanagement practices.” NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BIOSOLIDS APPLIED TO LAND: ADVANCING STANDARDS &
PRACTICES 1, 4 (2002).
In the fall of 2018, the EPA launched an investigation into the safety of biosolids, and Jill Trynosky, a
project manager with the inspector general’s office, quoted on the EPA’s podcast that “the EPA is unable to
state whether, and at what level, the pollutants found in biosolids pose a risk to human health or the
environment.” Jennifer A. Dlouhy, EPA Watchdog Questions Safety of Sewage Used as Fertilizer,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-15/safety-of-sewage-usedas-fertilizer-questioned-by-epa-watchdog. These critiques of Part 503, particularly the recent EPA
investigation, have made me interested in doing further research on the safety of biosolids on local
environments and the efficacy of Part 503.
82 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 16.
83 Radiolab, supra note 48.
84 What is Loop?, LOOP, https://www.loopforyoursoil.com/what-is-loop/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
85 Environmental Stewardship: Milorganite, MILORGANITE, https://www.milorganite.com/about-us (last
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other cities may have been marketing their biosolids for decades, the NYC Biosolid
Program was unique because of the scale of its sewage sludge available for reuse as
biosolids.86 However, unlike Milwaukee and King County which successfully
marketed their biosolids programs, NYC struggled to find buyers for its product.87
The reason why NYC had difficulty procuring agricultural contracts was largely due
to negative perceptions of the waste coming from NYC.88 Mike Sharp, the program
development director of NYC’s Biosolid Program, was tasked with not only
procuring contracts from states with substantial agricultural need for biosolids, but
also changing local misconceptions of the risks of biosolids from NYC.89 State after
state refused Sharp’s proposals while still accepting biosolids from other cities. 90
Michael Specter, an author for The New York Times, interviewed individuals
about their concerns over the use of NYC biosolids in a 1993 article that was entitled
Ultimate Alchemy: Sludge to Gold; Big New York Export May Make Desert, and
Budget, Bloom.91 Some of the concerns surrounding NYC biosolids included
unsupported fears that since the biosolids were from NYC, they were particularly
dangerous and contained “nuclear waste” or the “virus that causes AIDS.”92 These
fears were persistent despite the biosolids being thoroughly checked for pollutants
by employees at the sewage processing plants in New York, then by the EPA,93 then
before being “sealed in freight or truck containers,” then checked “again by local
health officials when it reach[ed] its destination,” and “then constantly monitored
once it is applied to the ground.”94
While the public fear-mongered and rallied against biosolids, farmers, who were
the groups that dealt directly with the physical product and observed its agricultural
benefits, fought for the product.95 Farmers praised the biosolids for restoring
nitrogen and phosphorus levels to their soil and because, “unlike chemical fertilizers,
[a biosolid] releases its nutrients slowly, making the soil stable and spongy so it can
absorb and hold more water.”96
visited Jan. 25, 2019).
86 Radiolab, supra note 48. In 1990, the population of NYC was 7,322,564 according to census data.
Decennial Census - Census 2000, NYC DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/census-summary-2000.page (last visited Jan.
25, 2019). In 2013, Radiolab reported that every day, NYC produces 125 million gallons of sewage sludge,
which is enough sewage sludge to fill the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California. Radiolab, supra note 48.
87 Radiolab, supra note 48.
88 Michael Specter, Ultimate Alchemy: Sludge to Gold; Big New York Export May Make
Desert, and Budget, Bloom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1993), https://nyti.ms/29jgVcp.
89 Radiolab, supra note 48; see also Lori Irvine & Anne Bonelli, Beneficial Use of Biosolids,
AMERICAN CITY & COUNTY (Oct. 1, 2000), https://www.americancityandcounty.com/2000/10/01/beneficialuse-of-biosolids/.
90 Radiolab, supra note 48.
91 Specter, supra note 88.
92 Id.
93 See supra Section II.A (regarding 503 Rules).
94 Specter, supra note 88.
95 Radiolab, supra note 48.
96 Specter, supra note 88.
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Despite these agricultural benefits, public opinion remained set against NYC
biosolids. In fact, the debate over biosolids turned to tension between businesses
and farmers and many residents and public officials.97 For example, in Oklahoma,
while farmers contracted with NYC for biosolids, “opposition by many residents and
public officials [was] so intense that a plan to ship 1,150 tons a day was defeated
after more than a year of suits, bitter letters and direct action.”98 Sharp became so
desperate to unload some of the biosolids that he even began offering to give NYC
biosolids away for no cost.99
Eventually, with the support of a few key farmers in Colorado, the NYC
Biosolid Program had its first contract.100 Colorado was the first state that truly
embraced NYC’s Biosolid Program.101 In 1992, the first train, packed with several
thousand tons of NYC biosolids, traveled west to Colorado.102 The success was not
immediate, with only a handful of farms using the biosolids because public
resistance remained high.103 However, the biosolid contracts between Colorado and
NYC flourished because the biosolids positively influenced Colorado’s wheat
production and reduced some of the pests that affected the state’s agricultural
production.
The reason that Colorado came to crave NYC biosolids is because Colorado is
a large wheat producer,104 and Colorado farmers found that the NYC biosolids
worked particularly well on their wheat crops.105 Dryland winter wheat harvesters
used about seventy-five percent of the biosolids that Colorado procured, and the
remainder was placed on “rangeland, sand dunes, irrigated alfalfa and irrigated
corn.”106 Wheat farmers found that by using NYC biosolids, they could increase
their wheat production.107 These early biosolid users also found that NYC biosolids
deterred damage from the Russian wheat aphid,108 a particularly insidious insect,
which feeds on wheat crops.109 In addition, the number of prairie dogs—another
Id.
Id.
99 Radiolab, supra note 48.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 COLO. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MKTS. DIVISION, COLO. AGRIC. FROM A TO Z 1-2 (2018). In 2016,
Colorado’s wheat industry sold $300 million in wheat products. Id.
105 Radiolab, supra note 48.
106 Irvine & Bonelli, supra note 89.
107 Radiolab, supra note 48. One of the early farmers to use NYC biosolids found his crops to increase
about a third from the previous year before the NYC biosolids were used. Id.
108 Id.
109 Aubrey A. Weiland et al., Biotypic Diversity in Colorado Russian Wheat Aphid (Hemiptera:
Aphididae) Populations, 101 J. ECON. ENTOMOLOGY 569, 569 (2008). The Russian wheat aphid is a small
insect that feeds on grain. Id. When these pests consume wheat, they leave “longitudinal streaking and
rolling of plant leaves,” which can lead to a reduction in plant height, shoot weight, number of spikes through
the jointing stage, and yield per plant.” Id. From 1987 to 1993, these insects caused annually around $127
million per year globally in direct and indirect costs. Id.
97
98
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agricultural pest that resides in the fields of Colorado—was also reduced where NYC
biosolids were laid.110
Colorado and NYC would go on to build the strongest biosolid land application
program in the country.111 Thousands of pounds of biosolids moved across the
country from NYC to be applied on Colorado farms yearly.112 As NYC’s Biosolid
Program gained traction in Colorado, NYC was providing, on average, enough
biosolids to cover 10,000 acres of land in Colorado, yet there was enough farmer
demand for 50,000-75,000 acres of farmland to be covered with biosolids.113 These
figures show the popularity of NYC biosolids in the 1990s and how NYC could not
keep up with the demand from the agricultural community.114
In 1998, after successfully marketing its biosolids in Colorado, NYC entered
three fifteen-year contracts with private companies.115 NYC entered into its first
contract with Colorado’s Environmental Protection and Improvement Control
(“EPIC”).116 Initially, this relationship was limited to the NYC biosolids being
directly applied to the Colorado farms, but beginning in 2004, EPIC subcontracted
with Parker Ag Services LLC, which began to treat NYC biosolids through alkaline
stabilization to create and market their own fertilizer products.117 NYC’s second
contract was with the New York Organic Fertilizer Company (“NYOFCo”) to
produce fertilizer pellets through thermal drying.118 Finally, NYC entered into the
third fifteen-year contract with Tully Environmental whereby its biosolids “were
processed with a combination of alkaline stabilization and composting” to be
“employed for mine reclamation, restoring nutrients to landscapes deteriorated by
mining practice.”119
These three fifteen-year contracts accounted for seventy percent of NYC’s
beneficial reuse of its biosolids with the remaining thirty percent coming from shortterm contracts.120 As a result, from 1998-2009, one hundred percent of NYC’s
biosolids were dedicated to beneficial reuse.121 However, the success of NYC’s

110 Radiolab, supra note 48. The Colorado farmers who used the NYC biosolids believed that the
human scent that emitted from the biosolids deterred prairie dogs. Id.
111 Irvine & Bonelli, supra note 89.
112 Id.
113 Radiolab, supra note 48. Looking at the total land application of biosolids in Colorado from 1998 to
1999 shows the drastic jump in demand for the product. In 1998, “12,715 wet tons of biosolids were applied
to land” in Colorado, and the following year, “in 1999, 36,875 wet tons were applied,” which covered
approximately 40,000 acres of farmland. Irvine & Bonelli, supra note 89.
114 Radiolab, supra note 48.
115 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 16.
116 Id. The EPIC contract was NYC’s most successful because it “was responsible for the beneficial
reuse of approximately twenty percent of NYC biosolids per year.” Id.
117 Id. at 16; see also General Information, PARKER AG SERVICES, LLC,
http://www.parkerag.com/Profile/About.htm (lasted visited Jan. 25, 2019).
118 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 16. A majority of these pellets are sold to citrus groves in Florida. Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 17.
121 Id.
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biosolids reuse program would all change with the onset of the 2008 financial
crisis.122
C. THE RISE OF LANDFILLS
With the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, NYC pressured its biosolid operators
in states like Colorado to reduce costs.123 Eventually, with operators unable to keep
up with these demands, NYC ended many of its biosolids contracts.124 For example,
in 2010, NYC ended its contract with NYOFCo, which had been set to expire in
2013.125 Ending the NYOFCo contract was a major blow to the NYC Biosolid
Program because the NYOFCo contract had been responsible for the disposal of half
of NYC’s sewage sludge for beneficial reuse as biosolids.126
Mayor Bloomberg’s administration found itself promising to continue to
promote the beneficial reuse of biosolids based on its green environmental policies
while also promising to reduce sewage sludge disposal costs.127 In a press release,
the Department of Environmental Protection ensured that NYOFCo’s replacement
contract, WeCare Organics, would be able to achieve both of these commitments.128
In reality, however, the WeCare contract and other subcontracts resulted in a major
reduction in beneficial reuse of biosolids with a rise in cheaper landfill application.129
By the end of 2012, NYC’s commitment of one hundred percent beneficial reuse of
its sewage sludge “had fallen to just 18%,” and the remaining eighty-two percent of
its sewage sludge being disposed in landfills.130
With a policy shift away from the beneficial reuse of the sewage sludge as
biosolids, NYC’s massive daily production of sewage sludge came to be mixed with
garbage and moved into landfills across the country.131 Contracts were made in
states like Alabama because of their “inexpensive land and permissive zoning.”132

Radiolab, supra note 48.
Id.
124 Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 14, at 16–18.
125 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 16–18. Along with ending the NYOFCo contract, NYC also changed
its EPIC contract, from handling approximately twenty percent of NYC’s biosolid beneficial reuse to only
one percent. Id. at 18. The Tully contract, which had originally handled twelve to twenty percent of the
biosolids, was changed to only ten percent. Id.
126 Id. The NYOFCo contract was responsible for the management of approximately 600 tons. Id.
127 Id. (citing Farrell Sklerov & Angel Roman, DEP Issues Request for Proposals to Reuse Sludge:
Seeks Cost-Effective, Sustainable Program to use Treated Sewage in Beneficial Way, NYC DEPT. OF ENVTL.
PROT.( 2010)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 18. In replacing NYOFCo, the WeCare contract accounted to use 400 tons of NYC’s sewage
sludge (thirty-three percent of NYC’s total sewage sludge) for beneficial reuse as biosolids, which was a
sixteen percent reduction from NYOFCo’s 600-ton commitment. Id. By 2012, however, WeCare “had only
processed approximately 6,444.04 dry metric tons, or only seven percent of NYC’s biosolids.” Id.
130 Id.
131 Radiolab, supra note 48.
132 Associated Press, supra note 1.
122
123
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III. WHY BIOSOLIDS ARE A STRONGER CHOICE
Landfilling remains the cheapest way for NYC to handle its immense, daily
production of sewage sludge.133 Despite landfilling’s cost effectiveness as a means
of disposal, landfilling has faced serious public backlash in the form of litigation and
local governance permit denials, as evidenced by the recent legal turmoil in Alabama
in the spring of 2018.134 The purpose of this Part of the Note is to advocate why
reliance on biosolids is a better option for NYC’s sewage sludge disposal than
landfilling.
This Part will begin by highlighting the costs and uncertainties associated with
the local nature of land use law, which empowers municipalities with tools to guard
itself against unpopular policies like landfilling. In connection to this idea of the
local nature of land use law, this Part will also show how—like the public outcry
against the landfilling method in Alabama—biosolids initially faced serious public
backlash. This Part will focus on how—unlike the landfilling method—the NYC
Biosolid Program persisted and succeeded because it had strong advocacy from the
agricultural community and the EPA.
Next, this Part will call into question the long-term cost-effectiveness of
landfilling. In particular, this Part will describe how the low prices of landfilling are
not actually sustainable because the number of available landfilling sites is
decreasing, which will contribute to increasing costs overtime. Further, this Part will
contrast the decreasing of available landfilling sites to the agricultural industry’s
ever-expanding need for beneficial reuses of biosolids in lieu of mined phosphates.
Finally, this Part will explain how the beneficial reuse of biosolids provides the
environmental benefit of restoring the phosphorus cycle, whereas landfilling does
not offer similar benefits.
A. THE RIPPLE EFFECTS OF LANDFILL LITIGATION
While landfilling may be a cheaper mode of disposal for NYC sewage sludge,
it carries distinct uncertainties that arise from the local nature of land use law—
where a legal injunction in one locality can impact the local governance decisions of
another locality. Because of these legal uncertainties, landfilling is a risky method
for disposing of biosolids. The risk is amplified by the nuisance-related issues that
spring from transporting a substance like sewage sludge by rail through many
different communities on its way to disposal.135 When presented with an unpopular
local matter like the permitting of sewage sludge through its municipality’s border,
133 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 19. According to Mike Sharp, the former program development
director of NYC’s Biosolid Program, and Wayne Shultz, who managed the dispersal of biosolids to
contracted farmers in Colorado, the cost of shipping and disposing NYC sewage sludge in landfills is “about
half as expensive” as it was to produce and ship the biosolids to Colorado. Id.; see also Radiolab, supra note
48.
134 See generally supra notes 1–11.
135 Id.
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a municipality frequently has the option to utilize its local land use authorities within
its local governments to successfully ban such permitting.136 Another option for a
municipality is to avail of a variety of litigation techniques to stop the trains filled
with sewage sludge from cutting through their communities.137
Things can get messy when the decision in one municipality affects a
neighboring municipality, which is what happened when a rail train of NYC sewage
sludge came to a halt in Parrish, Alabama as a result of litigation in neighboring West
Jefferson, Alabama.138 Jefferson County residents flooded the court system with a
variety of legal challenges about the transporting of sewage sludge to landfill sites
within their communities.139 First, the Jefferson County Commission (the
“Commission”) gave Big Sky Environmental and Sumiton Timber Company140
notice that “using the facility to unload the sewage sludge was a violation of the
county's zoning rules” on August 3, 2017.141 The Commission used traditional land
use zoning rules to justify its action because “operations at the rail yard produced an
odor that was detected at nearby homes, making the activity unlawful under the
property’s current zoning.”142 Ten days later, Big Sky Environmental and Sumiton
Timber Company applied to be re-zoned in order to be in compliance with the local
zoning ordinance, but that application was denied by the Commission on October 5,
2017.143
Big Sky Environmental and Sumiton Timber Company and Jefferson County
soon found themselves in federal court with Big Sky Environmental and Sumiton
Timber Company seeking a temporary restraining order and claiming that their
property rights were being infringed upon while Jefferson County sought court
clearance to enforce its zoning authority.144 Part of Big Sky Environmental and
Sumiton Timber Company’s claim was to challenge West Jefferson’s ability to
enforce its land use power by arguing that its landfilling operation “should be
governed under the federal laws pertaining to railroad operations, which would
See Jones, supra note 4; see also Associated Press, supra note 1.
Dennis Pillion (“Pillion I”), Sludge Fight: Legal Battles over Imported Sewage Waste Rage on in
Jefferson County, AL.COM (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/01/sludge_fight_legal_battles_ove.html; see also Dennis Pillion
(“Pillion II”), Judge: Jeffco Can Act on Stinky NY, NJ Waste Imports, AL.COM (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/01/judge_jefferson_county_can_enf.html; see also Jones, supra
note 4; see also Associated Press, supra note 1; see also Pillion, supra note 10.
138 See supra notes 4-6.
139 Pillion I, supra note 137.
140 Id.; See also Pillion II, supra note 137. Sumiton Timber is the company that “owns a rail yard in
western Jefferson County where sewage sludge is shipped by train from New York and New Jersey. Pillion
I, supra note 137. The sludge is then loaded onto trucks at the rail yard and hauled to the Big Sky landfill in
Adamsville for disposal.” Id.
141 Pillion I, supra note 137.
142 Pillion II, supra note 137; see also Pillion I, supra note 137. “The property is zoned I-3, as a
pulpwood yard, which it was under a previous owner, and the Commission said the current activities would
require a I-O zoning, the designation for industrial plots that emit obnoxious odors.” Id.
143 Pillion I, supra note 137.
144 Complaint at 1, Sumiton Timber Co., Inc. v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., No. 2:17-cv-01846-AKK (N.D.
Ala. Nov. 2, 2017), ECF No.1; Pillion II, supra note 137.
136
137
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supersede local zoning ordinances.”145 Ultimately, the property rights claims of Big
Sky Environmental and Sumiton Timber Company failed when Judge Abdul Kallon
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama allowed Jefferson
County to move forward with its legal action to seek enforcement of its zoning
laws.146 After months of litigation, West Jefferson County ultimately succeeded in
gaining clearance from the court to enforce its zoning authority to stop the shipment
of NYC sewage sludge into its municipal borders.147
As the legal drama in Jefferson County demonstrates, litigation surrounding
landfilling touches on a variety of local land use governance concerns. This type of
litigation can also have ripple effects in surrounding municipalities. Due to the local
nature of land use law and the fact that NYC’s sewage sludge must travel through a
variety of municipalities in order to reach a landfill, the litigation in West Jefferson
was not limited to the confines of West Jefferson, but instead, it also caused a local
governance crisis in Parrish.148 The negative ripple effects are compounded because
of the nature of the product. Sewage sludge has a variety of nuisance factors,
including intense odor and the health risks of diseases brought by flies.149 Parrish
was drawn into the litigation when Judge Kallon granted Jefferson County their
injunction against the Sumiton Timber Company and Big Sky Environmental.150
The consequence of this injunction was that the train carrying the sewage sludge to
West Jefferson became halted in neighboring Parrish, which lacked the zoning
regulation to block the cars.151
The optics of Parrish being forced to host tons of sewage sludge spawned both
an intense public outrage within Parrish itself and the national media, which
highlighted NYC’s failure to responsibly handle its own waste.152 The public fury
was so intense that a special council meeting was called in Parrish that voted to deny
Pillion I, supra note 137.
Pillion II, supra note 137. Not only was the Jefferson County litigation limited to federal court but
also state court. Pillion I, supra note 137. Relying on nuisance claims in state court, the town of West
Jefferson claimed the existence of flies and the smell caused the town to be unable to attract development in
the area. Id. Again, this case centered on local land use laws with West Jefferson claiming that Big Sky
Environmental and Sumiton Timber Company were violating West Jefferson’s zoning laws. Id.
147 Pillion II, supra note 137; see also Associated Press, supra note 1.
148 Associated Press, supra note 1.
149 Id.
150 Pillion II, supra note 137; see also Associated Press, supra note 1.
151 Associated Press, supra note 1.
152 Jones, supra note 4; see also Associated Press, supra note 1; see also Duara, supra note 6; see also
Dwyer, supra note 9. The USA Today article emphasizes the fury of residents by quoting Parrish residents
and local leaders. One resident, Sherleen Pike, is quoted as saying: “Would New York City like for us to
send all our poop up there forever?” See Associated Press, supra note 1. Further, the titles of some of these
nationally published articles, such as Duara’s How NYC’s Shit Ended Up Stuck on a Train in Alabama and
Dwyer’s The Poop Train's Reign Of Terror In Small-Town Alabama Has Ended, are reflective of the feelings
of animosity of residents that NYC could be so thoughtless of the well-being of Alabama residents impacted
by the landfilling process. See Duara, supra note 6; see Dwyer, supra note 9. While this Note does not focus
too much on the public relations aesthetics of NYC dumping its sewage sludge in Alabama, it is important to
highlight how litigation in one area that negatively impacts a neighboring area and the media frenzy that
covers that litigation can have negative public relations consequences.
145
146
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the business permit for Big Sky Environmental to transport its sewage sludge within
the municipality’s borders.153
Along with the public uproar over the waste, special interest groups played a
vocal role in undoing Big Sky’s permit. For example, the Black Warrior
Riverkeeper, an environmental group, vocalized the concern that as a result of its
lack of land use restrictions, Alabama was accommodating out-of-state waste by
acting as “‘an open-door, rubber-stamp permitting place’ for landfill operators.”154
The Black Warrior Riverkeeper recognized that rural Alabama localities were being
particularly exploited by lax permitting, and as a result, the organization publicly
lobbied for Big Sky to not receive a landfilling permit.155 In Parrish, Big Sky
Environmental did not have a strong special interest group arguing on its behalf to
sway the Parrish Council to renew its transportation permit so that it could continue
its landfill operation.156 Instead, it had widespread public unrest and special interest
groups like the Black Warrior Riverkeeper publicly lobbying the Parish Council to
deny the company landfilling permits.157
Because of the local nature of land use, landfilling can carry significant costs,
which is evidenced by the ripple effect of the litigation that began in West Jefferson
and then led to sewage sludge being indefinitely stalled in Parrish. The truly local
nature of land use law and the fact that sewage sludge is a product that carries intense
nuisance-related issues ought to offer a clear warning to NYC of the fragile nature
of relying on the landfilling method. This fragile nature is further exacerbated by
local special interest groups, like the Black Warrior Riverkeeper, publicly lobbying
against the landfilling permits.
The “poop train” scandal in Alabama shows that while landfilling may seem like
a cheaper option at first glance, the nature of land use law makes landfilling tenuous
and subject to the whims of local decisionmakers, who can effectively end a
landfilling operation through legal injunctions or city council decisions.
B. HOW BIOSOLIDS GAINED FAVOR FROM THE AGRICULTURAL
COMMUNITY
NYC was initially met with skeptics on the safety and efficacy of using biosolids
on crops.158 As it searched for contracts, NYC faced civil suits and contract

153 Jones, supra note 4. Parrish’s council members gave Big Sky Environmental three weeks to remove
250 metal containers of sewage sludge. Id.
154 Associated Press, supra note 1. This article contained quotes directly from Nelson Brooke, the
Riverkeeper of Black Warrior Riverkeeper. The Black Warrior Riverkeeper is “a citizen-based nonprofit
organization dedicated to improving water quality, habitat, recreation, and public health throughout…the
Black Warrior River watershed.” BLACK WARRIOR RIVERKEEPER, https://blackwarriorriver.org (last visited
Jan. 12, 2019).
155 Associated Press, supra note 1.
156 See id.; see also Jones, supra note 4.
157 Associated Press, supra note 1; see generally BLACK WARRIOR RIVERKEEPER, supra note 154.
158 See generally supra notes 87-94.
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cancellations based on local fears of water contamination and disease.159 The
clearest example of this resistance came from Oklahoma residents, who
overwhelmingly disapproved of the NYC biosolids and cancelled contracts.160 But
while the initial disapproval of biosolids seems to parallel the public rallying in small
Alabama towns against NYC training its sewage sludge to nearby landfills,161 there
is a clear distinction between the two. The key distinction between the public
resistance to biosolids in the early days of the NYC Biosolid Program and the landfill
disposals in Alabama is that biosolids had a demonstrably beneficial impact on the
crops where they were laid, which was noted by farmers and marketed by the EPA.
Based on that positive agricultural impact, this portion of the Note will focus on the
farmers who experienced the biosolids on their land advocated for and persisted in
developing contracts through NYC’s Biosolid Program, despite the public backlash.
The initial public resistance to NYC biosolids, the agricultural success of the
same biosolids, and the eventual twenty-year flourishment of the NYC’s Biosolid
Program can be seen in Colorado where farmers witnessed the demonstrable success
of the biosolids in producing strong crop yields and pest reduction in their fields.162
While Colorado farmers, particularly wheat farmers, came to advocate for the largest
contracts with NYC biosolids, other farmers from states like Texas, Colorado, and
Arizona also fought to establish similar contracts in the midst of public blowback.163
When writing “Ultimate Alchemy: Sludge to Gold; Big New York Export May
Make Desert and Budget, Bloom” for the New York Times in 1993, Michael Specter
interviewed enthusiastic farmers who promoted the use of biosolids in the face of
public controversy.164 It is helpful to understand the support of the biosolids by
looking directly at the quotes from the farmers that used NYC's biosolids on their
farms. As previously mentioned, the biosolids were uniquely “stable” and “spongy,”
which served the rocky soil of midwestern and western farms.165 Rock Cramer, a
cotton farmer from Arizona, described the biosolids as having:
…[e]verything we lack. A little zinc, some copper and an incredible load
of organic material. I wish I could put 25 tons of this product per acre on
my land. I would use 100 tons an acre if I could. As far as I'm concerned
if everyone's sewage was like New York's this world would be a better
place.166
Another biosolid user, Douglas Tallman, a farmer from Lamar, Colorado,
advocated for the circular nature of biosolids from New York. He is quoted as
saying: “…if there was ever a true sister city for New York it's Lamar. [Its] waste
Specter, supra note 88.
Id.
161 See generally supra notes 138-157.
162 See generally supra notes 95-117.
163 Specter, supra note 88.
164 Id.; see also supra notes 95-96.
165 Specter, supra note 88.
166 Id.
159
160
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comes out here and fertilizes our wheat fields. That helps make some of the bread
that finds its way back to [New York’s] tables.”167
Along with support from local farmers, the federal government also lobbied
local communities to turn biosolids into an agricultural norm. In 1994, during the
early boom of NYC’s Biosolid Program, the EPA dispersed a policy booklet
marketing the “great value” of biosolids at “improv[ing] soil fertility and tilth,
reduc[ing] need for and enhanced response to inorganic fertilizers, [producing] better
growth and quality of crops, and decreas[ing] consumption of energy.”168 In
addition, this EPA booklet took particular aim at some of the misconceptions about
biosolids by highlighting their safety and benefits. For example, it included a
cyclical chart of the process of waste from humans and animals being used as
biosolids, and then being processed by the plants, which would then be consumed
by animals and humans to start the cycle again.169 The chart’s graphic includes a
picture of a family with a young child, and next to the graphic is a line describing
the biosolid process as “only natural to return this rich source of nutrients and organic
matter back to the soil to perpetuate the cycle of life.”170 The booklet also hammers
into the reader the benefits to local communities by highlighting a variety of states,
like Maryland and Ohio, and municipalities, like Hannibal, Missouri; Madison,
Wisconsin; and Seattle, Washington, which all have biosolid programs.171 Further,
the booklet lists practical benefits of biosolids like their ability to suppress
pathogenic soil organisms,172 accelerate tree growth,173 and restore mined lands.174
The booklet concludes by providing the reader with even more sources praising the
benefits of biosolids in case the reader still had lingering doubts about the safety of
biosolids.175
Ultimately, the advocacy from farmers and the EPA created an environment
where even though the public may have held concerns about the safety of biosolids,
having such wild praise for their benefits on crops made them a desirable battle to
fight even in the face of public backlash. Unlike the use of landfills, which lack a
special interest groups and, instead, have local groups like the Black Warrior
Riverkeeper lobbying against their permitting, NYC’s biosolids overcame public
disapproval to become a major agricultural phenomenon for around twenty years
because of their avid proponents.176
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C. WHY BIOSOLIDS ARE A MORE ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
OPTION
While biosolids have the benefit of fewer legal battles and the support of the
agricultural community, they also offer a more environmentally sustainable form of
sewage sludge disposal than using landfills. Biosolids may be more expensive to
produce and ship to farms, but these economic factors fail to account for the
environmental benefit of biosolids in restoring the natural phosphorus cycle.
The advanced stabilization process, which is described in detail in Part II, shows
that biosolids are frequently sought after in agricultural products. Why is this? The
reason that biosolids are prime ingredients for healthy agricultural production is that
“biosolids contain several plant macronutrients, primarily nitrogen (N) and
phosphorus (P) and varying amounts of micronutrients such as boron, copper, and
zinc.”177 Phosphorus and the natural phosphorus cycle generally play an integral
role in the global food supply.178 The benefit of biosolids to the environmental health
of the natural phosphorus cycle is one of the key reasons why NYC’s use of biosolids
outweighs the cost-friendly landfilling method of disposal.
The natural phosphorus cycle is a circular process that spans millions of
years.179 Phosphorus starts as a nutrient that is buried under the seafloor.180 The
nutrient gets brought to the surface through “tectonic plate uplift” and enters land
rock.181 “Weather and erosion break down these deposits, allowing phosphorus to
enter the soil.”182 This phosphorus in the soil is toxic to humans, but not to plants,
which “are able to absorb the toxic phosphorus and process the nutrient into
phosphates.”183 These phosphates are not toxic to humans and when humans and
animals eat the plants, they absorb the phosphates.184 “To complete this cycle,
human and animal wastes, along with plant and animal decomposition, return these
nutrients to the soil.”185 Without any interference, the natural phosphorus cycle
“recycles itself, creating a closed loop of supply and demand.”186
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The phosphorus cycle has, however, faced a significant interference from
modern waste management systems.187 As industrialization occurred in Europe,
mass urbanization led to widespread epidemics, like the cholera outbreak of 1854 in
London, which came as a result of improper disposal of human waste leading to a
diseased and unsanitary water supply.188 Europe would develop techniques to
modernize its waste management, and the United States followed suit.189 As a result,
however, the treatment of the sewage sludge in wastewater sites instead of being left
to the land created a disruption to the phosphorus cycle.190 As the industrialization
and urbanization continued into the 20th Century, the Pacific Islands’ supply of
bones and guano supplied most of the global demand for phosphates.191
In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned Congress that “the phosphorus
content of American agricultural land” faced major diminishments,192 which could
impact American crop yields, and could detrimentally affect “the physical health and
economic security of the people of the nation.”193
Following President Roosevelt’s warning, agricultural engineers “mobilized
global mining efforts in ancient, phosphorus-rich marine deposits.”194 This process
has been exacerbated by a global population increase of 4.2 billion since 1950.195 As
a result, mines are degrading and are requiring the necessity “to access deeper layers
and extract a lower quality of phosphate-bearing rock.”196
Biosolids contain “90% or more” of the phosphorus that is present in sewage
sludge and can aid in the restoration of the phosphorus cycle.197 Proponents argue
that a reliance on biosolid land spreading “rather than allowing phosphorus to
accumulate in urban areas or landfill, recycles nutrients back into the soil,” imitates
the natural phosphorus cycle and reduces the global need for mined phosphates.198
In addition to restoring the natural phosphorus cycle—depending on how the
biosolids were stabilized—biosolids can be versatilely applied to a variety of
lands.199 The organic matter contained in biosolids “is useful for both fine-textured
(clay) soils and coarse-textured (sandy) soils.”200 Biosolids applied to “fine soils can
help make the soils looser or more friable and can increase the amount of pore space
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available for root growth.”201 The organic material in biosolids applied to coarse
soils “can increase the water-holding capacity of the soil.”202
Unlike biosolids—which assist in the restoration of the natural phosphorus cycle
through agricultural use—relying on landfills may offer a cheaper disposal option.
But landfills require huge tracts of land, which are shrinking and not sustainable as
a long-term disposal option.203 According to the EPA figures, there were 7,924
landfills in 1988, but by 2010, that number of landfills reduced to just 1,908. With
the shrinking number of landfills, there has been an increase in the fees associated
with landfills.204 Annual rates of landfills have increased by an “average of $1.24
per ton across the US each year.”205
While the number of landfills is shrinking and landfill disposal prices are rising,
the agricultural demand for phosphates is increasing, and biosolids can ameliorate
the phosphate demand.206 By 2008, industrial farmers were applying an annual 17
million metric tons of mined phosphorus on their fields.207 In contrast to the
shrinking number of landfills, the demand for mined phosphates for agricultural
purposes is expanding at a rate of around three percent a year.208
Along with the shrinking number of landfills is the fact that biosolids can
actually restore lands damaged by mining and smelting because of their ability to
reduce runoff.209 Biosolids are able to reinvigorate soil even on land like Palmerton,
an EPA Superfund Site.210 The soil and vegetation at Palmerton was destroyed from
ninety years of smelting zinc on the site.211 However, researchers introduced
biosolids into the soil at Palmerton and found that it restored the soil.212
NYC ought to consider that landfilling may be a cheaper option under
conditions, but it is not an option that has long-term sustainability because of the
shrinking number of landfills and the resulting landfill fee increases.213 Further,
cases like Palmerton show that biosolids can be used to revegetate mine spoil.214 On
the other hand, NYC can market their biosolids as a sustainable and natural
replacement to mined phosphates, which can assist in the health of the natural
phosphorus cycle.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The proper disposal of human waste is an immensely complicated issue that
contains considerable health, economic, legal, public support, and environmental
considerations. NYC has struggled to weigh these considerations equally.
In the past, NYC disregarded the sanitary health and environmental welfare by
disposing of its sewage sludge directly and untreated into the New York Bight Apex.
Following prompting by the federal government with the passage of the ODBA,
NYC created the NYC Biosolid Program that beneficially reused the sewage sludge
in the form of biosolids. This system met the EPA’s Rule 503 health standards and
local standards without significant legal barriers and prevailed despite initial public
pushback as a result of public support from the EPA and the agricultural community.
NYC’s immense biosolid program also benefits the environment because the
phosphorus from biosolids restores the natural phosphorus cycle and offers a
sustainable alternative to mining phosphates.
The success of the NYC Biosolid Program was cut short, however, based on the
economic hardships of the 2008 financial crisis. In order to cut disposal costs, NYC
has relied on landfills as the primary disposal method for its sewage sludge. This
short-term effort to cut costs by using landfills is publicly unpopular and does not
have any sort of advocacy group, like the EPA or the farmers who advocated for the
NYC Biosolid Program. As a result of being unpopular and without an advocate,
the landfilling method is open to legal backlash, as evidenced by the litigation in
West Jefferson. Due to the local nature of land use law, litigation in one region can
impact another region. Further, the contents of sewage sludge can cause health
effects like attracting harmful flies and breathing problems for people, especially
when the sewage sludge is grounded indefinitely due to litigatory injunctions.
Finally, the power of local governing bodies like the Parrish town council can flex
their muscle and use their permitting power to force an end to landfilling in their
town limits. Shipping biosolids to farms may be expensive, but they are steadily in
demand and have advocates in the farmers who use them.
Ultimately, NYC ought to reinvigorate the NYC Biosolid Program because it is
the most responsible and sustainable way of dealing with the city’s immense daily
output of sewage sludge. It’s time for NYC to send its poop train back to Colorado.

